

## Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-25 IO-13 ADP-00 NEAE-00 SSO-00

NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

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EUR/P - MR. SAVAGE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE

USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

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USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE

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E.O.11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJ: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING

FOLLOWING IS Q AND A PORTION OF DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S BRIEFING FOLLOWING AMBASSADOR SCALI'S STATEMENT IN NEW YORK JULY 26, 1973:

QUOTE: SPOKESMAN: THAT IS MY FORMAL STATEMENT. I MIGHT JUST NOTE THAT OUR PRINCIPAL OBJECTION TO THE RESOLUTION, AS PRESENTED FOR A VOTE, WAS TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2, WHICH STRONGLY DEPLORED --

Q. THAT WAS "DEPLORED?"

A. IT WAS. WHICH STRONGLY "DEPLORED" -- AT A MINIMUM. IT MAY HAVE ENDED UP "CONDEMN." I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD CHECK. -- ISRAEL'S CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF THE TERRITORIES.

THAT IN OUR VIEW, WAS ANOTHER WAY OF CALLING FOR A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY TRUE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

BEYOND THAT, MOST OF YOU WILL RECALL THE FACT THAT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 SPEAKS OF "WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED -- " ETC. ETC.

INTRODUCTION OF THE WORD "THE" --

Q. YES.

A. -- INTRODUCTION OF THE WORD, "THE," WOULD DO SUBSTANTIAL VIOLENCE TO THE INTENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242.

Q. SINCE THIRTEEN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY BRITAIN, AND BRITAIN WAS THE DRAFTER AND SPONSOR, DID VOTE FOR THIS UNCLASSIFIED

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RESOLUTION (INCLUDING THE WORD "THE") -- ARE WE NOW -- DO WE NOW FIND OURSELVES ISOLATED IN SUPPORTING A POINT OF VIEW WHICH THE MAJORITY OF MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DON'T SUPPORT ANYMORE?

A. I DOUBT IT -- WE WOULD BOTH HAVE TO KNOW A LITTLE BIT MORE ABOUT THE EXPLANATIONS OF THE VOTE THAN WE KNOW NOW, THAN WE NOW HAVE AVAILABLE TO US.

THE UNITED STATES, WHICH IS AT LEAST AS CONCERNED AS OTHER GOVERNMENTS THAT A NEGOTIATING PROCESS GETS UNDER WAY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, CONTINUES TO ATTACH A CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THE TINE WORD.

Q. WHEN 242 WAS ADOPTED, AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT GOING TO PUT ANY INTERPRETATION ON 242, PARTICULARLY ON THE QUESTION OF THE WORD "THE." THIS TIME WE ARE MAKING IT VERY CLEAR THAT WE ARE INTERPRETING THE RESOLUTION TO MEAN THE TERRITORIES, OR TERRITORIES -- IN OTHER WORDS, WE ARE TAKING A MORE FORMAL POSITION TODAY THAN WE DID IN 1967.

Q. THAT WAS SIX YEARS AGO. SOME WORDS HAVE ASSUMED AN IMPORTANCE IN THE COURSE OF THOSE SIX YEARS WHICH MAY NOT HAVE BEEN IMPUTED TO THEM AT THE TIME.

Q. WELL THE INTENT OF 242, IN 1967, AS HAS BEEN OUTLINED -- IT ISN'T THE SAME AS WE INTERPRET IT RIGHT NOW.

A. I DON'T THINK THAT THAT IS WHAT WAS SAID.

AS ORIGINALLY DRAFTED, 242 WAS DELIBERATELY GENERAL ON THIS POINT, AND 242 WAS ARRIVED AT AFTER A PROTRACTED, DIFFICULT, AGONIZING PROCESS THROUGH THE FALL OF 1967. WE OUGHT TO CONSIDER VERY CAREFULLY BEFORE WE UPSET THE BALANCE OF IT.

Q. YOUR STATEMENT ONLY DEVOTED ONE SENTENCE TO THE POINT OF THE RESOLUTION BEING PARTISAN AND UNBALANCED. DOES THAT INDICATE THAT IT IS NOT OUR PRIME CONCERN, OR THAT OUR MAJOR REASON FOR OUR VOTE WOULD --  
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A. THE MAJOR POSITIVE REASON FOR OUR VOTE WAS OUR CONVICTION, AS I SAID TOWARD THE END OF MY STATEMENT, THAT THE VETO WHICH AMBASSADOR SCALI CAST, WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF KEEPING ALIVE THE POSSIBILITY FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THAT IS THE OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BY ANYBODY'S ACCOUNTING OF IT.

Q. DOES THAT MEAN -- ARE YOU IMPLYING BY THAT THAT WE BELIEVE THAT HAD THIS RESOLUTION BEEN ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATING UNDER THAT KIND OF A FRAMEWORK?

A. I'LL ANSWER THAT IN A MORE GENERAL WAY BY SAYING THAT IT WAS OUR JUDGMENT THAT HAD THE RESOLUTION BEEN ADOPTED

BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IT WOULD HAVE PREJUDICED THE PROSPECTS OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ARRIVED AT BY A NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

Q. WELL, YOU ARE JUST REPEATING, IN SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT WORDS, WHAT YOU SAID BEFORE. BUT HOW WOULD IT PREJUDICE IT?

MY INTERPRETATION, AND I ASK WHETHER YOU QUARREL -- WOULD IT PREJUDICE IT FROM THE ISRAEL POINT OF VIEW?

A. ON BACKGROUND, THE ISRAELIS ARE ONE OF THE TWO PRINCIPAL POTENTIAL NEGOTIATING PARTNERS, AND IT TAKES TWO TO NEGOTIATE.

Q. CAN I TAKE THIS QUESTION A LITTLE FURTHER? IS IT THE DEPARTMENT'S FEELING -- AND HERE I AM JUST PROJECTING A THOUGHT -- THAT HAD THIS RESOLUTION BEEN ADOPTED, THE NEXT STEP WOULD HAVE BEEN A RESOLUTION UNDER CHAPTER 7 -- NAMELY, AN ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION?

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